- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Results for 'Stephanie R. Larson'
966 found
Order:
- Is the Psychopathic Brain an Artifact of Coding Bias? A Systematic Review.Jarkko Jalava, Stephanie Griffiths, Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen & B. Emma Alcott - 2021 - Frontiers in Psychology 12:654336.Questionable research practices are a well-recognized problem in psychology. Coding bias, or the tendency of review studies to disproportionately cite positive findings from original research, has received comparatively little attention. Coding bias is more likely to occur when original research, such as neuroimaging, includes large numbers of effects, and is most concerning in applied contexts. We evaluated coding bias in reviews of structural magnetic resonance imaging (sMRI) studies of PCL-R psychopathy. We used PRISMA guidelines to locate all relevant original sMRI (...)
- Desires, Scope, and Tense.Delia Graff - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):141-163.According to James McCawley (1981) and Richard Larson and Gabriel Segal (1995), the following sentence is three-ways ambiguous: -/- Harry wants to be the mayor of Kenai. -/- According to them also, the three-way ambiguity cannot be accommodated on the Russellian view that definite descriptions are quantified noun phrases. In order to capture the three-way ambiguity of the sentence, these authors propose that definite descriptions must be ambiguous: sometimes they are predicate expressions; sometimes they are Russellian quantified noun phrases. (...)
- Considerações legais e forenses do aborto infeccioso bovino na “Saúde Única”: Revisão (18th edition).Jackson Barros Do Amaral, Vinícius José Moreira Nogueira & Wendell da Luz Silva (eds.) - 2024 - Londrina: Pubvet.In Brazil, the social demand for veterinary expertise is growing. However, there is still a shortage of professionals trained in this area to apply specific knowledge to each case. Studies and research into forensic veterinary medicine are necessary for veterinary experts to assist in investigations and legal proceedings. Veterinary medicine has subjects on its curriculum that cover the knowledge needed to apply in the fields of animal health, public health and the environment. The interaction between human and veterinary medicine, as (...)
- Loneliness in medicine and relational ethics: A phenomenology of the physician-patient relationship.John D. Han, Benjamin W. Frush & Jay R. Malone - 2024 - Clinical Ethics 19 (2):171-181.Loneliness in medicine is a serious problem not just for patients, for whom illness is intrinsically isolating, but also for physicians in the contemporary condition of medicine. We explore this problem by investigating the ideal physician-patient relationship, whose analogy with friendship has held enduring normative appeal. Drawing from Talbot Brewer and Nir Ben-Moshe, we argue that this appeal lies in a dynamic form of companionship incompatible with static models of friendship-like physician-patient relationships: a mutual refinement of embodied virtue that draws (...)
- Trust, epistemic norms, & vaccine hesitancy in Black communities.Maddox Larson - manuscriptThis essay offers a philosophical analysis of the increased rates of hesitancy among Black Americans regarding treatment for Covid-19. I argue that public health researchers have identified epistemic norms pertaining to the credibility and trustworthiness of public health institutions in Black communities. In other words, norms of credibility have developed in Black communities as a result of the mistreatment of Black Americans by public health institutions and organizations. To make this argument, Section 2 argues that the “origin” or historical circumstances (...)
- First-person disavowals of digital phenotyping and epistemic injustice in psychiatry.Stephanie K. Slack & Linda Barclay - 2023 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 26 (4):605-614.Digital phenotyping will potentially enable earlier detection and prediction of mental illness by monitoring human interaction with and through digital devices. Notwithstanding its promises, it is certain that a person’s digital phenotype will at times be at odds with their first-person testimony of their psychological states. In this paper, we argue that there are features of digital phenotyping in the context of psychiatry which have the potential to exacerbate the tendency to dismiss patients’ testimony and treatment preferences, which can be (...)
- Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Oxford University Press.Moral duties are regularly attributed to groups. Does this make conceptual sense or is this merely political rhetoric? And what are the implications for these individuals within groups? Collins outlines a Tripartite Model of group duties that can target political demands at the right entities, in the right way and for the right reasons.
- Early Modern Experimental Philosophy.Peter R. Anstey & Alberto Vanzo - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 87-102.In the mid-seventeenth century a movement of self-styled experimental philosophers emerged in Britain. Originating in the discipline of natural philosophy amongst Fellows of the fledgling Royal Society of London, it soon spread to medicine and by the eighteenth century had impacted moral and political philosophy and even aesthetics. Early modern experimental philosophers gave epistemic priority to observation and experiment over theorising and speculation. They decried the use of hypotheses and system-building without recourse to experiment and, in some quarters, developed a (...)
- Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):231–248.Plausibly, only moral agents can bear action-demanding duties. Not all groups are moral agents. This places constraints on which groups can bear action-demanding duties. Moreover, if such duties imply ability then moral agents – of both the individual and group varieties – can only bear duties over actions they are able to perform. I tease out the implications of this for duties over group actions, and argue that groups in many instances cannot bear these duties. This is because only groups (...)
- Climate obligations and social norms.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 22 (2):103-125.Many governments are failing to act sufficiently strongly on climate change. Given this, what should motivated affluent individuals in high-consumption societies do? This paper argues that social norms are a particularly valuable target for individual climate action. Within norm-promotion, the paper makes the case for a focus on anti-fossil fuel norms specifically. Section 1 outlines gaps in the existing literature on individuals’ climate change obligations. Section 2 characterises social norms. Section 3 provides seven reasons why social norms are a particularly (...)
- Feeling the Vibrations: On the Micropolitics of Climate Change.Stephanie Erev - 2019 - Political Theory 47 (6):836-863.Climate change is more than a discrete issue demanding political attention and response. A changing climate permeates political life as material processes of planetary change reverberate in our bodies, affecting subterranean processes of attention and evoking bodily responses at and below the threshold of awareness. By way of example, I explore the register of bodily feeling to raise the possibility that proliferating anomalies in atmospheric, oceanic, and seismic activities are entering into subliminal experiences of time and confounding embodied expectations of (...)
- Explaining Causal Selection with Explanatory Causal Economy: Biology and Beyond.Laura R. Franklin-Hall - 2015 - In P.-A. Braillard & C. Malaterre (eds.), Explanation in Biology: An Enquiry into the Diversity of Explanatory Patterns in the Life Sciences. Springer. pp. 413-438.Among the factors necessary for the occurrence of some event, which of these are selectively highlighted in its explanation and labeled as causes — and which are explanatorily omitted, or relegated to the status of background conditions? Following J. S. Mill, most have thought that only a pragmatic answer to this question was possible. In this paper I suggest we understand this ‘causal selection problem’ in causal-explanatory terms, and propose that explanatory trade-offs between abstraction and stability can provide a principled (...)
- The Epistemic Risk in Representation.Stephanie Harvard & Eric Winsberg - 2022 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 32 (1):1-31.
- The Core of Care Ethics.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.The ethics of care has flourished in recent decades yet we remain without a succinct statement of its core theoretical commitment. This book uses the methods of analytic philosophy to argue for a simple care ethical slogan: dependency relationships generate responsibilities. It uses this slogan to unify, specify and justify the wide range of views found within the care ethical literature.
- Values, Agency, and Welfare.Jason R. Raibley - 2013 - Philosophical Topics 41 (1):187-214.The values-based approach to welfare holds that it is good for one to realize goals, activities, and relationships with which one strongly (and stably) identifies. This approach preserves the subjectivity of welfare while affirming that a life well lived must be active, engaged, and subjectively meaningful. As opposed to more objective theories, it is unified, naturalistic, and ontologically parsimonious. However, it faces objections concerning the possibility of self-sacrifice, disinterested and paradoxical values, and values that are out of sync with physical (...)
- Beyond Individualism.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - In Hilary Greaves & Theron Pummer (eds.), Effective Altruism: Philosophical Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.In this chapter, Stephanie Collins examines the idea that individuals can acquire ‘membership duties’ as a result of being members of a group that itself bears duties. In particular, powerful and wealthy states are duty-bearing groups, and their citizens have derivative membership duties (for example, to contribute to putting right wrongs that have been done in the past by the group in question, and to increase the extent to which the group fulfils its duties). In addition, she argues, individuals (...)
- Interconnected Blameworthiness.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):195-209.This paper investigates agents’ blameworthiness when they are part of a group that does harm. We analyse three factors that affect the scope of an agent’s blameworthiness in these cases: shared intentionality, interpersonal influence, and common knowledge. Each factor involves circumstantial luck. The more each factor is present, the greater is the scope of each agent’s vicarious blameworthiness for the other agents’ contributions to the harm. We then consider an agent’s degree of blameworthiness, as distinct from her scope of blameworthiness. (...)
- Being Sure of Each Other: An Essay on Social Rights and Freedoms, by Kimberley Brownlee.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):700-716.
- The Government Should Be Ashamed: On the Possibility of Organisations' Emotional Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2018 - Political Studies 4 (66):813-829.When we say that ‘the government should be ashamed’, can we be taken literally? I argue that we can: organisations have duties over their emotions. Emotions have both functional and felt components. Often, emotions’ moral value derives from their functional components: from what they cause and what causes them. In these cases, organisations can have emotional duties in the same way that they can have duties to act. However, emotions’ value partly derives from their felt components. Organisations lack feelings, but (...)
- Collective Responsibility Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 154 (4):943-954.Which kinds of responsibility can we attribute to which kinds of collective, and why? In contrast, which kinds of collective responsibility can we not attribute—which kinds are ‘gappy’? This study provides a framework for answering these questions. It begins by distinguishing between three kinds of collective and three kinds of responsibility. It then explains how gaps—i.e. cases where we cannot attribute the responsibility we might want to—appear to arise within each type of collective responsibility. It argues some of these gaps (...)
- We the People: Is the Polity the State?Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (1):78-97.When a liberal-democratic state signs a treaty or wages a war, does its whole polity do those things? In this article, we approach this question via the recent social ontological literature on collective agency. We provide arguments that it does and that it does not. The arguments are presented via three considerations: the polity's control over what the state does; the polity's unity; and the influence of individual polity members. We suggest that the answer to our question differs for different (...)
- Epistemic Vulnerability and Tolerance in Society.Maddox Larson - 2024 - The Philosophy, Politics, and Economics Review 3:15-28.The question of church-state separation has haunted America since her founding. James Madison and select founding fathers suggest that religions and states are better off when they minimize (or altogether eliminate) their interactions. Many Muslims in Iran, for instance, believe the opposite – aligning state functions with religious motives results in the most effective state. In this paper, I propose a model of thinking about church-state separation in which states and religions must maintain epistemic vulnerability to allow legal, political, and (...)
- Duties of Group Agents and Group Members.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (1):38-57.
- I, Volkswagen.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):283-304.Philosophers increasingly argue that collective agents can be blameworthy for wrongdoing. Advocates tend to endorse functionalism, on which collectives are analogous to complicated robots. This is puzzling: we don’t hold robots blameworthy. I argue we don’t hold robots blameworthy because blameworthiness presupposes the capacity for a mental state I call ‘moral self-awareness’. This raises a new problem for collective blameworthiness: collectives seem to lack the capacity for moral self-awareness. I solve the problem by giving an account of how collectives have (...)
- Misgendering and its Moral Contestability.Kapusta Stephanie - 2016 - Hypatia 31 (3):512-519.In this article, I consider the harms inflicted upon transgender persons through “misgendering,” that is, such deployments of gender terms that diminish transgender persons’ selfrespect, limit the discursive resources at their disposal to define their own gender, and cause them microaggressive psychological harms. Such deployments are morally contestable, that is, they can be challenged on ethical or political grounds. Two characterizations of “woman” proposed in the feminist literature are critiqued from this perspective. When we consider what would happen to transgender (...)
- Precis of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):85-89.This paper provides an overview of Group Duties: Their Existence and Their Implications for Individuals.
- Just war theory and non-state actors: Political violence in the Black Panther Party.Maddox Larson - manuscriptThe Black Panther Party is now commonly associated with violence; however, this was far from what they aimed to represent. The Party was aimed at total social and political reconstruction and, their larger point, creating an equitable society in which Black Americans could thrive. The criticism which the Party faced (and still faces) was through their use of “armed self-defense” and methods of political violence. From a philosophical perspective, many interesting questions can be considered when evaluating the morality of the (...)
- Collectives’ and individuals’ obligations: a parity argument.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):38-58.Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all-things-considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug into what (...)
- Filling Collective Duty Gaps.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (11):573-591.A collective duty gap arises when a group has caused harm that requires remedying but no member did harm that can justify the imposition of individual remedial duties. Examples range from airplane crashes to climate change. How might collective duty gaps be filled? This paper starts by examining two promising proposals for filling them. Both proposals are found inadequate. Thus, while gap-filling duties can be defended against objections from unfairness and demandingness, we need a substantive justification for their existence. I (...)
- The Claims and Duties of Socioeconomic Human Rights.Stephanie Collins - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):701-722.A standard objection to socioeconomic human rights is that they are not claimable as human rights: their correlative duties are not owed to each human, independently of specific institutional arrangements, in an enforceable manner. I consider recent responses to this ‘claimability objection,’ and argue that none succeeds. There are no human rights to socioeconomic goods. But all is not lost: there are, I suggest, human rights to ‘socioeconomic consideration’. I propose a detailed structure for these rights and their correlative duties, (...)
- (1 other version)The Transfer of Duties: From Individuals to States and Back Again.Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 150-172.Individuals sometimes pass their duties on to collectives, which is one way in which collectives can come to have duties. The collective discharges its duties by acting through its members, which involves distributing duties back out to individuals. Individuals put duties in and get (transformed) duties out. In this paper we consider whether (and if so, to what extent) this general account can make sense of states' duties. Do some of the duties we typically take states to have come from (...)
- The Philosophy of G. K. Chesterton.W. F. R. Hardie - 1930 - Hibbert Journal 29:449.
- Distributing States' Duties.Stephanie Collins - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (3):344-366.In order for states to fulfil their moral duties, costs must be passed to individual citizens. This paper asks how these costs should be distributed. I advocate the common-sense answer: the distribution of costs should, insofar as possible, track the reasons behind the state’s duty. This answer faces a number of problems, which I attempt to solve.
- Doxastic Wronging, Disrespectful Belief, & The Moral Over-Demandingness Objection.Stephanie Sheintul - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-11.Some scholars working on the ethics of belief argue that we can wrong each other in virtue of what we believe. This thesis is known as doxastic wronging. Proponents of doxastic wronging have different views about when our beliefs wrong. A prominent view is that our beliefs wrong when they falsely diminish. I call this the false diminishment account of doxastic wronging. In this paper, I argue against this account on the grounds that it is morally overdemanding. Nevertheless, I agree (...)
- How Much Can We Ask of Collective Agents?Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (7):815-831.Are obligations of collective agents—such as states, businesses, and non-profits—ever overdemanding? I argue they are not. I consider two seemingly attractive routes to collective overdemandingness: that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would be overdemanding for members; and that an obligation is overdemanding on a collective just if the performance would frustrate the collective’s permissible deep preferences. I reject these. Instead, collective overdemandingness complaints should be reinterpreted as complaints about inability or third-party costs. These are (...)
- States’ culpability through time.Stephanie Collins - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1345-1368.Some contemporary states are morally culpable for historically distant wrongs. But which states for which wrongs? The answer is not obvious, due to secessions, unions, and the formation of new states in the time since the wrongs occurred. This paper develops a framework for answering the question. The argument begins by outlining a picture of states’ agency on which states’ culpability is distinct from the culpability of states’ members. It then outlines, and rejects, a plausible-seeming answer to our question: that (...)
- Just How Much Do We Really Know?Dewey B. Larson - 1986 - Reciprocity 15 (2):1-15.This memorandum, originally written in 1961 and published in an obscure journal in 1986, emphasizes the degree to which general acceptance has been substituted for proof in current scientific practice. Its main objective is to reveal which generally accepted ideas have no sound factual basis and therefore _could_ be erroneous. The new and improved basic theory that is fervently desired must conflict with some items of this kind, and probably with many of them. Such conflicts, if confined to the categories (...)
- Carving out a Sonorous Space for Erotic Tenderness: A Deleuzo-Guattarian Reading of Björk’s Becoming-Tender as Queer.Stephanie Koziej - 2023 - Deleuze and Guattari Studies 17 (3):424-448.This article argues that through her songs and music videos Pagan Poetry, Cocoon and Hidden Place, versatile artist Björk is able to carve out a space for erotic tenderness. This erotic tenderness will be unearthed as a queer or minor sexuality, in the sense that it goes against a phallic and genital majoritarian account of sexuality. Tender sexuality might not be obviously queer, yet a detour through the early work of Freud will show how our hegemonic account of sexuality is (...)
- Group Responsibility and Historicism.Stephanie Collins & Niels de Haan - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):754-776.In this paper, we focus on the moral responsibility of organized groups in light of historicism. Historicism is the view that any morally responsible agent must satisfy certain historical conditions, such as not having been manipulated. We set out four examples involving morally responsible organized groups that pose problems for existing accounts of historicism. We then pose a trilemma: one can reject group responsibility, reject historicism, or revise historicism. We pursue the third option. We formulate a Manipulation Condition and a (...)
- Responsibility to Reflect: Doxastic Reflection as Epistemic Responsibility in Democracy.Maddox Larson - manuscriptIn this paper, I argue that responsible knowers are responsive to critical feedback that their reasons for believing in a given proposition or using certain principles of reasoning are inadequate. The project of democracy expects that agents can provide reasons for their beliefs during testimonial exchange. Voters provide reasons to representatives. Representatives provide reasons to voters. Voters provide reasons to each other. And representatives provide reasons to each other. This means that when voters or representatives cannot provide reasons, democratic mechanisms (...)
- Role Obligations to Alter Role Obligations.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - In Alex Barber & Sean Cordell (eds.), The Ethics of Social Roles. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.Many roles are situated within organizations. The occupants of these roles often confront a dilemma between (i) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and functions of the role, as bestowed upon the role by the organization’s decision-making procedures, and (ii) the occupancy conditions, performance conditions, and function that the role should ideally have. This chapter argues that this dilemma should be resolved in favour of (ii). Yet this does not require forgoing role-based considerations in favour of extra-role considerations. Instead, we should (...)
- Duties and Poverty.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - In Gottfried Schweiger & Clemens Sedmak (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Poverty. Routledge.This chapter focuses on the question of who has duties regarding poverty and what those duties demand, from within the perspective of contemporary analytic normative philosophy. The chapter is structured in three sections. Section 1 considers the duties of those living in poverty, which might be either self-regarding or other-regarding duties, and which must be tempered by concerns of overdemandingness. Section 2 considers the duties of affluent individuals. These are imperfect duties grounded in affluent individuals’ relations to the structures that (...)
- Care Ethics: The Four Key Claims.Stephanie Collins - 2017 - In David R. Morrow (ed.), Moral Reasoning. New York: Oxford University Press.This short article provides an overview of "care ethics" for students who are new to moral theory.
- Religion has failed... now what?: Defining and redefining the purpose and presence of religious ideals in the 21st century.Maddox Larson - manuscriptThis paper will explore the notion that religiously justified acts have often been the source of great harm. From the continued persecution of the LGBTQ community to acts like the Waco incident and in extreme cases, even genocide can often stem from religious belief. There does exist, however, a more generalized, noncentralized belief system (which I call “spirituality”) which seeks similar motives as most organized religions, but rarely—if ever— leads towards such terrifying and monstrous acts. In this paper, I pose (...)
- Response to Critics.Stephanie Collins - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):141-157.This is a response to the critial comments by Anne Schwenkenbecher, Olle Blomberg, Bill Wringe and Gunnar Björnsson.
- When does ‘Can’ imply ‘Ought’?Stephanie Collins - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):354-375.ABSTRACTThe Assistance Principle is common currency to a wide range of moral theories. Roughly, this principle states: if you can fulfil important interests, at not too high a cost, then you have a moral duty to do so. I argue that, in determining whether the ‘not too high a cost’ clause of this principle is met, we must consider three distinct costs: ‘agent-relative costs’, ‘recipient-relative costs’ and ‘ideal-relative costs’.
- Providing free heroin to addicts participating in research - ethical concerns and the question of voluntariness.Edmund Henden & Bærøe Kristine - 2014 - The Psychiatric Bulletin 38 (4):1-4.Providing heroin to heroin addicts taking part in medical trials to assess the effectiveness of the drug as a treatment alternative, breaches ethical research standards, some ethicists maintain. Heroin addicts, they say, are unable to consent voluntarily to take part in these trials. Other ethicists disagree. In our view, both sides of the debate have an inadequate understanding of voluntariness. In this article we therefore offer a fuller conception, one which allows for a more flexible, case-to-case approach in which some (...)
- Gersonides's approach to emanation and transcendence: Evidence from the theory of intellection.Julie R. Klein - 2004 - In Maria Cândida da Costa Reis Monteiro Pacheco & José Francisco Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale = Intellect and imagination in medieval philosophy = Intelecto e imaginaçao na filosofia medieval: actes du XIe Congrès international de philosophie médiévale de la Société internationale pour. Turnhout: Brepols Publishers. pp. I: 53-64.
- Care for a Profit?Stephanie Collins & Luara Ferracioli - 2023 - Perspectives on Politics 21 (2):625-639.We vindicate the widespread intuition that there is something morally problematic with for-profit corporations providing care to young children and elders. But instead of putting forward an empirical argument showing that for-profit corporations score worse than not-for-profits when it comes to meeting the basic needs of these vulnerable groups, we develop a philosophical argument about the nature of the relationship between a care organisation, its role-occupants, and care recipients. We argue that the correlation between profit and lower-quality care is a (...)
- Corporations’ Duties in a Changing Climate.Stephanie Collins - 1920 - In Jeremy Moss & Lachlan Umbers (eds.), Climate Justice and Non-State Actors: Corporations, Regions, Cities, and Individuals. UK: Routledge.The urgency of the problem of climate change calls upon us to investigate the climate duties of agents beyond the state. Individuals are the most salient candidate in this respect. In section I, I argue that the idea that individuals might have duties to reduce their emissions raises difficult issues about individual difference-making. The rest of the chapter, then, focuses on what I take to be the third most-salient duty-bearer: large for-profit corporations. These entities have largely been overlooked in philosophical (...)
| 1 — 50 / 966 |
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6f9648bdd6-69tc5 uwo